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  There is a distinction between sense and nonsense, between what we can say and think, and 
what we only think we can say. In Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, the distinc-
tion between sense and nonsense is drawn starting out from the meaningful proposition, which 
expresses a thought. From this follows that there are sentences in language which do not ex-
press any thought, but are either necessarily true or necessarily false: tautologies and contra-
dictions. According to Wittgenstein, they do not say anything about reality, but show the logical 
structure of language and reality. Any attempt to say what can only be shown results in non-
sense. 
  So the doctrine of saying and showing follows from the definition of sense presented in the 
Tractatus. Contrary to meaningful propositions and senseless propositions, nonsense is only 
defined negatively – it is, as it were, excluded from Wittgenstein’s logical investigation of our 
language. 
 
  In the following, I intend to take a closer look at the theory of meaning presented in the prop-
ositions of the Tractatus, focusing on the distinction between sense and nonsense. Before going 
any further in that direction, there is, however, a difficulty ahead of us: on the theory presented, 
the distinction between sense and nonsense is not expressible in meaningful propositions. In 
the final propositions of the Tractatus, Wittgenstein declares: 
 
6.54   My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me 
eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them – as steps – to climb up 
beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) 
         He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright. 
 
7      What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence. 
 
    Over the years, this puzzling conclusion has led to different and diverging interpretations. In 






“...after all, Mr Wittgenstein manages to say a good deal about what cannot be said, thus sug-
gesting to the sceptical reader that possibly there may be some loophole through a hierarchy of 
languages, or by some other exit.”   
 
Russell’s suggestion, that there might be a solution through the introduction of a hierarchy of 
languages, may seem appealing from a post-Tarskian perspective.   
 
  For the members of the Vienna Circle around 1929, the Tractatus presented a criterion of 
demarcation between logically well-formed sentences in a scientific language and metaphysi-
cal statements. On their view, a physicalist reduction initially seemed possible1. However, the 
status of the propositions of the Tractatus itself remained an open question.  
 
  Another early reader, F.P. Ramsey, objected that Wittgenstein tried to whistle what he could 
not say – in other words, that on Wittgenstein’s theory, the propositions of the book itself were 
illegitimate nonsense.  
 
  In a second generation, including some of Wittgenstein’s pupils, like Elisabeth Anscombe 
and Peter Geach, as well as other well-known Wittgenstein scholars such as David Pears and 
Peter Hacker, the propositions of the Tractatus are nonsense exactly because of Wittgenstein’s 
doctrine on what cannot be said, but only shows.  
 
  According to this approach, Wittgenstein presents us with a metaphysical doctrine, stating 
that what can, strictly speaking, be said in language is restricted by its logical syntax because 
of the necessary metaphysical relation between the logical form of language and the logical 
form of reality. Accordingly, what the propositions of the Tractatus try to say about the logical 
structure of reality is something which only shows in the logical form of language.   Neverthe-
less, Wittgenstein succeeds in conveying an insight to his readers about the metaphysical rela-








  In opposition to this view, there is a linguistic approach, claiming it must be the logical form 
of language that determines the logical form of reality, not the other way round. Representing 
this view, we may mention Brian McGuinness and Erik Stenius.  
 
   In more recent years, a much more radical line of interpretation has emerged. On this so-
called resolute reading, we should take Wittgenstein seriously, and realise that the propositions 
of the Tractatus are sheer nonsense – not illegitimate nonsense, trying to say something about 
the logical form of reality. On this view, foremostly represented by Cora Diamond and James 
Conant, we should distinguish between the aim of Wittgenstein with his book, and what his 
propositions seem to say. Seemingly, the book presents a metaphysical doctrine, but the au-
thor’s real aim is therapeutical: to liberate the reader from a metaphysical illusion, allowing 
her to throw away the propositions of the book. (See the section on Diamond below) 
 
These different and diverging interpretations of the puzzling ending of Wittgenstein’s book 
give rise to some further questions: According to the metaphysical view, the logical form of 
language necessarily mirrors the logical form of reality. But if so, how is it possible to convey 
an insight about the logical form of language, in propositions violating its logical syntax? And 
what guarantees that the logical form of language does mirror the logical form of reality? Ac-
cording to McGuinness, it would seem to be a capacity that our brain fortunately has acquired.2   
 
  The linguistic interpretation does not resolve the problem, either. As pointed out by Stenius, 
Wittgenstein does not include a key of interpretation in his semantic theory3. So how do we 
know that there is a connection between language and reality, at all?   
 
  For the resolute reading, the difficulties arise on two different levels: Firstly, the proponents 
of this view have to show that Wittgenstein does not present a theory of meaning, drawing a 
line between sense and nonsense, in his book. But if so, on what grounds is the distinction to 
be made? And if there is no principle for such a distinction, on what grounds should the prop-
ositions of the Tractatus be completely rejected, and thrown away? Doesn’t the distinction 
 
 
2 Brian McGuinness, Approaches to Wittgenstein, p. 82 




between sense and nonsense follow, from the theory of meaning presented? And wouldn’t it 
be difficult to imagine that the propositions of the book are complete nonsense? As pointed out 
by von Wright, they are in some sense “intelligible”, after all. 
 
  On my view, these difficulties are not of a merely exegetical interest, but rather mirror certain 
problems related to our understanding of the logic of our language. To claim that the logical 
syntax of language determines which propositions are meaningful because of a metaphysical 
correspondence between the logical form of reality and the logical form of language is a met-
aphysical doctrine, which would require our stepping out of language, out of its logic.  
   
  As this hardly seems a very promising way out of the problem, I will suggest a third solution: 
a modal approach to the Tractatus, defining sense as logical possibility. Here, I am foremost 
going to discuss the view presented by Georg Henrik von Wright. On this view, the meaningful 
proposition can be true and it can be false – thus, what the proposition says already shows its 
truth-conditions, but what it says is that something is the case.  
  Accordingly, logic takes care of itself, and does not require any justification: neither in the 
form of a postulated necessary metaphysical connection between language and reality, nor 
through a key of interpretation, translating sentences in our language into a meta-language, nor 
in the form of a criterion determined by our ordinary use of sentences in our ordinary language.  
 
 This also implies, as Wittgenstein shows in the Tractatus, that there is no need for a theory of 
types (TLP 3.331, 3.332) – it is superfluous to present rules defining that it is allowed to say 
meaningfully that Socrates is a human being.   
 
  On the contrary, it is because language already reaches out to reality that a meaningful prop-
osition can be true and can be false, in every thinkable language, including our ordinary eve-
ryday one. As stated in the Tractatus, the question is not about some abstract questions, but 
about the most concrete ones – about how we use our language, and simultaneously, about our 
understanding of it and its inherent logic; about what we can say and what we cannot say, about 






2 FREGEAN BACKGROUND 
2.1 Frege and Wittgenstein 
  Before advancing further into the question about the distinction between sense and nonsense 
in the Tractatus, some background is needed. Where earlier interpreters often started out from 
a comparison between Russell and Wittgenstein, the present discussion, initiated by the New 
Wittgensteinians, have mainly focused on a comparison between Frege and Wittgenstein. 
 
  Both Frege’s and Russell’s investigations of the logical form of language, i.e., its relation to 
reality, are fundamental for Wittgenstein’s work. In the Tractatus, they are the only philoso-
phers mentioned in the Preface and to be criticised in the propositions of the book. Moreover, 
Wittgenstein already in the Preface declares that the logic of our language has been misunder-
stood, and that he intends to correct that misconception. One could of course object that Witt-
genstein’s view of language and its logic isn’t directly derivable from Frege’s, and that the 
doctrine of saying and showing in the Tractatus above all is a criticism of Russell’s theory of 
Types. Objections on this line to the New Wittgensteinians have been presented by Peter 
Hacker and Mathieu Marion, among others:  
 
    It is evident that the distinction [between saying and showing] emerged in the final section 
of the *Notes on Logic’ of September 1913 (Appendix I to the Notebooks 1914-1916). It re-
sulted from reflecting on Russell’s theory of types, and not, as Diamond and Conant assert 
without textual support, from reflecting upon Frege’s puzzlement about the assertion that the 
concept horse is (or is not) a concept.4   
 
    [My reading is] is…also opposed to the more recent American readings of the Tractatus, 
whose sole aim is to show that Wittgenstein did not intend to propose a new theory of logic on 
the lines of Frege and Russell, but rather to show, in a fundamentally destructive approach, that 
every attempt of this kind cannot but result in producing nonsense. (That is supposedly the 
meaning of the final sentences of the Tractatus.) 5   
 
 
4 Hacker 2000 p. 371 





  Although Hacker and Marion are correct concerning the comparison between Russell and 
Wittgenstein, it may also be fruitful to compare Wittgenstein’s conception of the logical form 
of language in relation to Frege’s conception of meaning, and lack of meaning. As Frege and 
Russell are both mentioned in Wittgenstein’s Preface, I think we may safely presume that his 
criticism does not merely aim at Russell, but also at Frege. 
 
2.2  Frege’s Conception of Meaning 
  The starting point for Frege is in mathematics, or rather, the philosophy of mathematics. Like 
Russell, he was investigating the logical foundations of mathematics, in order to prove mathe-
matics to be a science. The question asked by Frege in his first philosophical work, The Foun-
dations of Arithmetics, concerns the notion of number – what is the number five, for instance? 
According to Michael Dummett, in Frege’s Philosophy of Language, this way of questioning 
eventually leads Frege on to further questions, concerning language and meaning. 
 
  Frege distinguishes between the name for a number, and the number itself. For instance, the 
name ’5’ and what it stands for, namely the number five. This reasoning also involves him with 
further questions in philosophy of language and theory of meaning. The answer Frege arrives 
at in the Foundations of Arithmetic is that a number neither consists of the sign printed on the 
page, nor of our imagination of the number five, but that it is something objective, the number 
designated by the sign ’5’. The Romans designated it by another sign, ’V’, which shows that 
what is meant by the sign is its expressed content or objective meaning.6   
 
  Likewise, Frege analyses the name of  ’the capital of Germany’, designating Berlin as its 
objective meaning. Numbers, as well as concepts, are thus provided with a logical or concep-
tual analysis, starting out from the distinction between function and argument. Accordingly, 
the number five, designated by the sign ’5’, can be further analysed, and shown to consist of 
the function five times one, (1+(1(1+(1+(1). In the same way, the expression ’the capital of 
 
 




Germany’ stands for a function the capital of (   ), which, completed with the argument Ger-
many, yields Berlin as the value of the function. In addition to the distinction between sign and 
content, Frege later on makes a further distinction, between sense (Sinn) and meaning 
(Bedeutung), which is important for Wittgenstein. 
 
  Dummett shows the advantage of Frege’s analysis to be that it allows for the analysis of ex-
pressions with several variables, i.e. that it is possible to provide the meaning and the truth 
value of expressions which are not analysable in terms of subject and predicate. Thus, general 
statements and existential ones may be analysed in the same model as single sentences – Dum-
mett argues that Frege’s analysis is close to modern second order predicate logic, where the 
truth conditions of sentences are provided by their logical content, or meaning.7   
 
  Dummett of course also points out some differences between Frege’s analysis and an explicit 
model theoretical one, but at the same time he claims that Frege’s is implicitly model theoret-
ical and accordingly could be used for excluding meaningless sentences from language. We 
will come back to this point later. 
 
2.3 Sense and Meaning 
  Frege also makes a distinction between function and argument, as well as a further one be-
tween concept and object, which is a special case of the first one. According to him, the dis-
tinction between concept and object is grounded in the nature of things.8  These distinctions 
are less important for Wittgenstein. 
 
  The reason for making the distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung is epistemological – the 
question is about what we can know. His argumentation goes as follows: If we say that a=a, 
then what we say is true, and does not add to our knowledge. But if we say that a=b, the state-
ment adds to our knowledge. Hence, saying that the Evening star is the Morning star is different 
from saying that the Morning star is the Morning star.  
 
 
7 Dummett 1973, p. 81-89 





  In both cases, the names stand for the planet Venus, but only in the first case, the sentence 
provides us with some new knowledge. Therefore, ’a=b’ is not reducible to ’a=a’, and, hence, 
an analysis that only has access to the distinction Bedeutung is insufficient. What is needed is 
a further distinction, that between the mode of presentation or sense (Sinn), and denotation or 
meaning (Bedeutung). According to Frege, a sentence is the name of a truth-value, the True or 
the False, determined by the thought expressed.9   
 
2.4   Meaning and Lack of Meaning, in Frege 
  In the following, I’m going to discuss two diverging interpretations concerning meaning and 
lack of meaning, which are of relevance for the debate concerning the distinction between sense 
and nonsense in the Tractatus. 
 
  Michael Dummett takes it that Frege, in his work, presents a theory of meaning which allows 
for excluding grammatically correctly constructed, but nevertheless meaningless sentences 
from natural language, as it is possible to show, using Frege’s conceptual analysis, that sucj 
sentences violate the logical principles of language.  
 
  Hans Sluga, in Gottlob Frege, presents an alternative interpretation, by taking into account 
that Frege does not make any distinction between object language and meta-language, i.e. be-
tween a sentence in language and its truth-conditions, which can only be rendered in a meta-
language.10 Sluga shows that the absence of a distinction between what a sentence says and its 
meaning poses a problem for Frege, resulting in the construction of meaningless sentences. 
Hence, it is not possible for Frege to draw a line, in language, between logically correct sen-
tences and meaningless ones – as the distinction can only be made in a meta-language. It is 
only there that one may meaningfully say something meaningful about the distinction between 
meaning and lack of meaning. On Frege’s theory, it is impossible to do so. 
 
 
9 Frege, op.cit, pp. 143-163 






  According to Dummett, Frege’s theory of meaning is not only a theory for the construction 
of a logically and scientifically correct language, where every sentence is either true or false, 
but in addition provides a tool for analysing sentences in natural language. On his view, Frege 
thus replaces traditional grammar with his theory of meaning. Arguing his point, Dummett 
presents us with the sentence: ”Chairman Mao is rare.” According to him, the reason why this 
grammatically correct sentence is meaningless, is that the sentence is incorrectly constructed: 
the argument, ”chairman Mao” cannot be the argument of a second-order function ” X is rare”, 
but only of a first-order function, like ”x is blue”. 11  
 
  Here, we might present Dummett with two objections: Firstly, one may ask whether one 
should consider a meaningless sentence to be grammatically correct. Secondly, there is Sluga’s 
objection to Dummett. According to Sluga, Frege does not present any theory of meaning about 
our language, but aims at presenting the logical construction of a thought in a Kantian, episte-
mological perspective.  
   
  According to Sluga, we are concerned with a purely logical distinction, that cannot be mean-
ingfully expressed in language, as long as there is no meta-language. Hence, we cannot talk 
about meaning in language unless we accept that what we try to say is reduced to gibberish. So 
there is no theory of meaning, in Frege’s writings. Instead, we should read Frege in a purely 
epistemological perspective, starting out from Kant. Here one might object that Sluga does not 
provide any answer to the question how what we can know is related to what we meaningfully 
can say.12    
 
  Dummett focuses on this aspect, and thinks that Frege reaches an epistemological view, 
grounded in a logical conception. According to Dummett, Frege managed to establish that the 
logical structure of language is related to the logical structure of reality. A logically correct 




11 Dummett, ibidem p. 51 




  In natural language, it is possible to construct sentences containing subject and predicate with-
out expressing any thought, whatsoever. But in order to talk meaningfully about sentences with 
a logical structure and sentences violating the logical principles of language, a model of inter-
pretation is required. Yet, Dummett admits that Frege does not come up with any explicit so-
lution. 
 
  Where an analysis in terms of subject and predicate does not allow for the expression of sen-
tences containing more than one variable, Frege’s analysis allows for sentences of multiple 
generality, such as “Every number divisible with the sum of itself plus two” or “A planet which 
has two moons more than any other planet”. As we have already seen, Frege’s analysis liberates 
the meaning of the sentence from its linguistic form, and allows for a logical analysis of the 
meaning expressed, yielding the truth-value of the sentence depending on its meaning: the 
meaning of the sentence “The Moon is a satellite to the Earth” is true if and only if the Earth 
has a satellite and that satellite is the Moon. As pointed out by Dummett, this means that there 
are ontological implications of the logical structure of language – what we say about reality is 
true or it is false, tertium non datur.13  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
  Summing up, Dummett seems to focus on Frege’s impact on the development of modern logic 
and philosophy of language, yet not paying much attention to the fact that Frege’s analysis 
does not  clearly distinguish between object language and meta-language. This gives rise to 
meaningless sentences, such as Frege’s own example: ”’The concept horse’ is not a concept.” 
On the other hand, it is difficult to see in what way Frege’s analysis of sentences takes a stand 
on whether they are grammatically correct or not – one would rather get the impression that 
Frege primarily is interested in questions concerning the meaning and truth-value of sentences. 
As pointed out by Dummett, Wittgenstein’s doctrine of saying and showing solves these Fre-









3 SAYING AND SHOWING 
3.1 The Metaphysical Interpretation of the Tractatus 
  The starting point for the metaphysical interpretation of the Tractatus, in the present work 
represented by Peter Geach’s and Peter Hacker’s readings, is the requirement for a justification 
of the connection between language and reality.  
 
  According to both Geach and Hacker, the Tractatus offers a justification in terms of a meta-
physical doctrine, on which the logical form of language necessarily mirrors the logical form 
of reality. From this doctrine follows that the logical syntax of language shows the logical form 
of reality, and “what can be shown, cannot be said” (TLP 4.1212). If so, then any attempt to 
describe the logical form of language necessarily results in transgressing its logical syntax. But 
that implies that the propositions of the Tractatus themselves result in nonsense, an effort to 
say something that shows. Hence, the reader who has understood what the Tractatus tries to 
say sees that its propositions, strictly taken, are nonsense.14  
 
  In the following, I will discuss Geach’s and Hacker’s interpretations, respectively, more in 
detail. As we shall see, their interpretations diverge on some crucial points. 
 
3.2 The Parallel Between Frege and Wittgenstein 
   Geach presents an explanation of the distinction between sense and nonsense, starting out 
from Frege. According to Geach, the apparently paradoxical conclusion of the Tractatus is best 
understood as following from the doctrine of saying and showing. In order to understand why 
the doctrine, presented by Wittgenstein, cannot be expressed, Geach thinks we had better go 
back to Frege’s writings, where it is already present. 
 
  On Frege’s analysis, a sentence expresses a thought about something in reality – for instance 
that the moon is a satellite to the Earth – which either is true or false. A sentence is the complex 
name consisting of a proper name, in our case ’the moon’ and the name of a concept,’ (  ) is a 
 
 




satellite to the Earth’. ’The moon’ stands for the moon, and ’(   ) is a satellite to the Earth’ for 
the concept (   ) is a satellite to the Earth, which, when completed with an object, the moon, is 
true. We are, accordingly, presented with a sentence expressing a logically structured thought 
yielding a truth-value. 
 
  The differences between the logical categories Frege uses in his analysis are, however, not 
expressible in logically well-formed sentences. Trying to say that ’(   ) is a satellite to the Earth’ 
is a concept only results in meaningless proposition-like constructions.15  
 
  According to Geach, this means that there is, already, a doctrine on saying and showing in 
Frege. It is impossible to talk about the distinction between logical categories in language in 
the language itself or any other language. Trying to do so through a hierarchy of languages – 
talking about meaning in the object language in a meta-language – is excluded, because logi-
cally well-formed sentences are limited to sentences expressing thoughts about reality.  
 
  What Frege tries to say is thus strictly speaking unsayable. But what he tries to say is the 
insight conveyed – that the logical structure of reality shows in logically well-formed sentences. 
Therefore, the logical structure of reality necessarily delimits the logical syntax of language. 
The sentence ’The moon is a satellite to the Earth’ shows the distinction between the logical 
categories of argument and function, but to talk meaningfully about this distinction only results 
in meaningless sentence- constructions. Yet, the insight into the logical structure of language 
is conveyed from speaker to hearer, although it cannot be expressed in meaningful sentences. 
According to Geach, there is a criterion for the insight having been reached: mastering the 
logic, one is able to produce logically well-formed sentences translatable into a formal logical 
symbolism, excluding sentences about logical categories. It is possible to show that one masters 
the logic, but the insight required is, strictly speaking, inexpressible. 
 
  According to Geach, the doctrine on saying and showing presented in the Tractatus is, how-








The Frege-Wittgenstein notion of what comes out but cannot be asserted is almost irresistible, 
in spite of its paradoxical nature, when we reflect upon logic. Wittgenstein’s view is that su-
perficially indicative sentences of ethics, aesthetics, and religion must be assigned the same 
role as the strictly improper sentences used didactically in logic: the role of conveying insights. 
The difficulty besetting this further view is that it is a much more obscure question how we can 
tell in these cases that an insight actually has been conveyed. p.56 
 
 As already mentioned above, a sentence for Frege is a complex proper name denoting a truth-
value. On Geach’s view a proposition, according to the Tractatus, isn’t a name, but a fact. 
Hence, a proposition is a linguistic fact. If a proposition e.g. stands for the fact that the cup is 
on the plate, this either is or is not the case. In other words, we have the description of an object 
standing in a certain relation to another object, but this is not just another fact; it is something 
showing in what the sentence already says. Therefore, Geach concludes that the logical struc-
ture of reality shows in the logical syntax of language.16 
 
In relation to Geach’s interpretation, it is motivated to ask whether facts in reality mirror facts 
in language. We may also ask if it – even in Frege – is the case that the logical structure of 
reality delimits the logical structure of language, and not the other way round? The crucial 
point is, however, that Geach does not pay due attention to the modal concepts of logical pos-
sibility, logical necessity and logical impossibility, which are necessary for the understanding 
of the conception of the logic of our language presented in the Tractatus. But let us for the 
present content ourselves with noting the following propositions from the Tractatus, which do 
not seem to agree with the argumentation presented by Geach: 
 
5.5563    In fact, all the propositions of our everyday language, just as they stand, are in perfect 
logical order. – That utterly simple thing, which we have to formulate here, is not an image of 
the truth, but the truth itself in its entirety.  








4.061    It must not be overlooked that a proposition has a sense that is independent of the facts: 
otherwise one can easily suppose that true and false are relations of equal status between signs 
and what they signify. 
            In that case one could say, for example, that ‘p’ signified in the true way what ‘not-p’ 
signified in the false way, etc. 
 
6.375    Just as the only necessity that exists is logical necessity, so too the only impossibility 
that exists is logical impossibility.  
 
  What Geach calls Wittgenstein’s broader application of the doctrine of saying and showing 
from the logical to ”ethical, aesthetical and religious expressions” is on his view, not argued 
for. As we have seen, Geach thinks it is justified to use meaningless sentences for didactic 
purposes, conveying the insight necessary for mastering logic. That the necessary insight has 
been reached may be tested in an exam – but how, Geach wonders, could we prove that some-
one has reached the insight needed for mastering ethical, aesthetical or religious propositions?17  
 
  The question posed by Geach shows that he has missed some central aspects of the Tractatus. 
Firstly, the distinction between insight and mastery is not mentioned until Philosophical Inves-
tigations, and is totally irrelevant in Wittgenstein’s earlier work. Secondly, the logical, the eth-
ical and the aesthetical are transcendental, according to the Tractatus. (TLP 6.41- 6.421). 
Hence, the question is not about an epistemic categorizing of different kinds of sentences in 
language, but about a definition of the meaningful proposition describing reality. According to 
Wittgenstein, the ethical and the aesthetical belong to ”the transcendental” (TLP 6.421). As we 
are going to see, Hacker’s position differs from Geach’s, on this point.  
 
  The other objections Geach presents against Wittgenstein concern logic. I do not intend to 
discuss Geach’s criticism of the elementary propositions and simple objects postulated by Witt-
genstein, but will instead focus on the question Geach poses concerning why Wittgenstein re-
jects Frege’s assertion sign, arguing that it is of merely psychological significance and irrele-
 
 




vant, from a logical point of view. (Tlp 4.442). From Geach’s Fregean perspective, Wittgen-
stein’s argument does not seem motivated. Geach points out, reasoning from unasserted prem-
isses surely must differ from arguing from reasoning from asserted premisses? As he points 
out, there is a difference between, on the one hand, arguments where a true sentence implies 
the truth of another sentence, and, on the other hand, a dialectical reasoning aiming at showing 
that an argument leads up to a contradiction.18 (62-63).  
 
It seems Geach disregards the fact that in reasoning from asserted premisses – a reasoning 
where the truth of a sentence follows from the truth of another sentence – the assertion sign 
surely is superfluous.    
 
  Another weakness in Geach, to which we shall return later, is his explanation of Frege’s con-
ception of logical analysis. According to Frege, a sentence expresses a thought, and may be 
logically analysed if it is logically correctly structured, which means that is has a truth-value, 
and thus, meaning (Bedeutung). Hence, sentences devoid of meaning lack truth-value. How-
ever, this does not imply that a sentence lacking truth-value necessarily is devoid of sense 
(Sinn).19   
 
  Geach is right concerning the parallel between Frege and Wittgenstein concerning what a 
sentence says and what only shows in what it says – but that does not imply that there would 
be a doctrine of saying and showing, in Frege. This has been pointed out by Michael Dummett: 
 
[T]ake Frege’s views about the relation between sense and reference. Sense determines refer-
ence, but reference does not determine sense; nevertheless, when we lay down what the refer-
ence of some expression is to be, we thereby provide a sense for it. As I remarked in Frege: 
Philosophy of Language, and, as I understand it, Peter Geach has worked out much more in 
detail, it is difficult to expound this doctrine without inconsistency save by invoking the dis-
tinction drawn in the Tractatus between saying and showing…The distinction between saying 
 
 
18 Geach, p. 62-63 




and showing is not only consonant with Frege’s ideas, but almost required for a coherent state-
ment of them. Indeed, had Frege had this distinction at his command, a great deal of misunder-
standing of his doctrine of sense would surely have been avoided.20 
 
  Arguably, there is a difficulty Frege is presented with, which he blames on language – not on 
its logical structure, as it were: 
 
   Die Sprache befindet sich hier in einer Zwangslage, welche die Abweichung vom Gewöhn-
lichen rechtfertigt. 21 
 
   Der Verständigung mit dem Leser steht freilich ein eigenartiges Hindernis im Wege, daβ 
nämlich mit einer gewissen sprachlichen Notwendigkeit mein Ausdruck zuweilen, ganz wört-
lich genommen, den Gedanken verfehlt, indem ein Gegenstand genannt wird, wo ein Begriff 
gemeint ist. Ich bin mir völlig bewuβt, in solchen Fällen auf ein wohlwollendes Entgegenkom-
men des Lesers Eingewiesen zu sein, welcher mit einem Körnchen Saltz nicht spart.22 
 
4 Modality in the Tractatus 
4.1 Logical Necessity   
  In a clarifying article by von Wright, he presents two different conceptions of logic: an exten-
sional logic, starting out from truth-functions, and an intensional logic, where the truth-func-
tions result from an analysis in terms of logical possibility and logical necessity.23  
 
  If we consider the conception of language and its logic in the light of this distinction, we will 
see that his explanation of the logic assumed in the Tractatus is intensional. Several of the 
difficulties following from Hacker’s explanation discussed above depend on the conception of 
 
 
20 Dummett 1991, p. 238 
21 Frege, KS p. 171 
22 Frege, KS p. 177 




the logic of our language presented by him, and may easily be avoided if one adopts an inten-
sional conception, where meaning is defined in terms of logical possibility.  
 
  According to von Wright, the extensional definition of logic was originally presented by Ru-
dolph Carnap. On this definition, a proposition about a given concept is represented by its 
extension (class or relation). Later on, this conception has developed into the view that every 
meaningful sentence is reducible to the truth-function of its elementary sentences, which are 
truth-functions of themselves.  
 
   According to von Wright, one might say that the official Tractatus position concerning the 
meaningful proposition and what it says – the thought expressed – is extensional. On the other 
hand, what the proposition shows – and what must be passed over in silence – is intensional.24   
So far, modality is shown. 
 
  According to Hacker’s presentation of the Tractatus, Wittgenstein’s most important result 
was his explanation of logical necessity, based on his fundamental thought: that the logical 
constants do not stand for objects, as Frege had presumed.25   
   Hacker explains the logical syntax of language in terms of necessity, but considers possibility 
in terms of empirically contingent truth-values – i.e. extensionally. He does not seem to pay 
enough attention to the fact that in the Tractatus, necessity is explained in terms of possibility.  
 
  According to Hacker’s explanation of logical necessity, the propositions of logic consist of 
tautologies, saying nothing about reality. The truth value of the proposition “it is raining or it 
not raining” can be read off the proposition itself. By contrast, the truth value of an empirical 
proposition like “it is raining” does not depend merely on the proposition, but on how things 
stand in reality.  
 
  Tautologies are meaningless (sinnlose), because they do not say anything. This shows that the 
propositions of logic are not, as such, to be considered normative, e.g what Frege calls The 
 
 
24 von Wright ibidem p. 186 




Laws of Thought. Wittgenstein succeeds in showing that there is no need for an independent 
justification for the inferences in logic – contrary to Frege’s and Russell’s understanding. This, 
in its turn, means that the idea of constructing a logically ideal language can be rejected  –  the 
tautologies show the relations of inference between propositions in our language, and in any 
possible language.  
 
   A tautology offers in itself a method for proving that it is a tautology – true on all conditions. 
(TLP 4.461) Logic consists in inferences in the form of tautologies, and hence the Tractatus 
offers a formal distinction between meaningless propositions, tautologies and contradictions – 
and meaningful propositions, which have to be compared with reality in order to yield their 
truth value. A meaningful proposition, according to Hacker, may be true or may be false. 26  
 
4.2 Bipolarity  
  In Notes on Logic, Wittgenstein writes: 
 
  Every proposition is essentially true-false. Thus a proposition has two poles (corresponding 
to case of its truth and case of its falsity). We call this the sense of the proposition. The meaning 
of a proposition is the fact which actually corresponds to it.   (Notebook  p.94) 
 
 
  That a proposition has two poles is later in the text called the bipolarity of the proposition. 
The poles are then ”true” and ”false”. In the Notebooks, he puts this point as folllows:  
 
  Damit ein Satz wahr sein kann, muβ es auch falsch sein können. (p.55) 
 
 
  This is a clear statement of the principle in modal terms. This statement evidently impressed 
von Wright. He expressed it by saying that a meaningful proposition can be true and can be 
false. Wittgenstein’s way of expressing the point in the quote above is not in modal terms. 
 
 




However, his use of the hyphen in ”true-false” can be interpreted in two ways, either as a 
disjunction, p V not-p, which shows its close connection with the Law of the Excluded Middle, 
or as a conjunction, in modal terms Mp and M not-p. 
 
   When Wittgenstein speaks of the two poles of the proposition, the poles can be interpreted 
in both ways, as Mp and as M not-p. This is favoured by von Wright. The two ways of reading 
”true-false”  
 also answer to the following thesis, namely that when you say that a proposition is true or 
false, this shows both poles, Mp and M not-p. So the topic of showing is central in the Tractatus. 
There, one central thesis is that modalities can only be shown. In the following, we have taken 
the liberty to say things which, according to the Tractatus, can only be shown. 
 
  In fact, Wittgenstein does this himself – ”possibility” occurs frequently in his presentation of 
his ontology, and also in his working out of the picture theory of the proposition.  
 
  The bipolarity of the proposition has an important role in his setting up truth-tables of the 
proposition. There he writes ”p (T, F)”. Here, again, it is said that p is true or false. But the two 
poles Mp and M not-p show, as we can see.  
 
  In writing out the truth-table for a tautology, ”p or not-p (T,T)”, we can see that it has only 
one pole, ”true”. This shows that a tautology cannot be but true – not true or false, like p. A 
contradiction cannot be but false. In a late paper of von Wright, “Remarks on Wittgenstein’s 
use of the terms “Sinn” and “unsinnig”, “wahr” and “Gedanke” in the Tractatus27”, he says 
that logical propositions are ”unipolar”. Nonsensical propositions, which lack truth-value, are 
”zeropolar”. (p.101-102)   
 
  Thus Wittgenstein is able to explain the nature of tautologies and contradictions starting out 









4.3 Logical Possibility  
  In order to distinguish sense from nonsense – that is, drawing the line from within, as Witt-
genstein has it – a definition of sense is required. For, as stated by Wittgenstein, it is impossible 
to think the unthinkable, to step out of language and of the world. Hence, starting out from 
asking what nonsense might be cannot lead very far – how are we supposed to distinguish it 
from sense, unless we first have a clear idea of the concept of sense presented?  
   
  The concept of sense will be discussed in terms of logical possibility – the meaningful or 
significant proposition, expressing a thought about a possible state of affairs in reality can be 
true and can be false, and that already shows its truth-conditions 
 
  My presentation relies on three claims, concerning the Tractatus: 
 
1) The implicit logic of the Tractatus is modal, and intensional 
2) The concept of sense is defined as relying on the Principle of Bipolarity 
3) The connection between language and reality – the logical form they share – depends 
on an internal relation of immediacy of agreement which is fundamental for the concept 
of sense central to the Tractatus   
 
 
  In addition, we shall see that the doctrine of saying and showing presented by Wittgenstein, 
which he characterized as his main insight, is not the starting point for the conception of the 
logic of our language presented, but follows from the definition of sense given in his work. 
Hence, the inexpressibility thesis concluding it cannot be rightly understood unless one climbs 
the rungs of the ladder – that is, unless one first gets a grip of the conception of sense that is 
central to the semantic theory presented in the propositions of the Tractatus.  
  As stated by von Wright, the exclusion of nonsense follows from the definition of meaningful 
propositions and senseless propositions given; nonsense is only defined negatively, as it were. 






4.4 Intensionality   
  In ”Modal Logic and the Tractatus” a very enlightening article by G.H. von Wright 28, he 
discusses the concept of sense (Sinn), showing that the logic presented in the Tractatus has its 
starting point in the concept of the significant proposition (sinnvoller Satz), that is, in the defi-
nition of sense (Sinn) and that it is given in the context of an intensional view of logic – that is, 
following the Preface of the Tractatus, in the logic of our language. 
 
  As pointed out by von Wright, the early readers of the Tractatus, among them Carnap and 
other logical positivists, favoured an extensionalist interpretation of the logic presented in the 
book, backing up their own reductionist view of meaningful discourse with Wittgenstein’s 
tenet that all significant propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions. Yet, as 
argued by von Wright: 
 
  One could say that Wittgenstein’s position is ‘extensionalist’ only when it comes to what can 
be said, in meaningful propositions. What is ’intensionalist’ cannot be spoken of. It may nev-
ertheless show itself in language. (p. 186) 
 
  Concerning the puzzling conclusion of the book, von Wright states the following: 
 
  It is a paradox, often misunderstood and sometimes even stupidly ridiculed, that the Tractatus, 
in the view expressed in the work, is written in strictly meaningless language. (idem) 
 
  How are we to understand von Wright’s claims? His argumentation starts out from the divi-
sion into an extensionalist and an intensional view of logic. 
 
  An extensionalist conception of logic only takes the extension of the concept presented in the 
proposition or sentence – that is, its range of truth-values – into account. We might say that the 
 
 






proposition is reduced to the truth-values of the propositional function presented. Thus, on an 
extensional view, the proposition is either true or false. This of course applies to tautologies 
and contradictions as well as to meaningful propositions; where a meaningful proposition is 
either true or false, a tautology is always true and a contradiction never true (that is, always 
false).  
 
On an extensional view, one might therefore be tempted to define the meaningful proposition 
negatively, as a propositional function which is neither always true, nor always false.  
 
If the necessary propositions are tautologies and the impossible propositions are the contradic-
tions, then necessity and impossibility are ‘defined’ in truth-functional terms. The contingent 
could then be characterized ‘negatively’ as that which is neither tautological nor contradictory. 
(p.188) 
 
  But, as pointed out by von Wright, in the Tractatus Wittgenstein does not start out from de-
fining tautologies and contradictions, but from defining the semantic concept of sense (Sinn), 
that is, from the concept of the significant proposition.  
 
   An intensional view starts out from the content of the significant proposition; from the 
thought expressed by the proposition, that is, from the possible state of affairs it describes. 
What the significant proposition says is that things stand so, that something is the case. But 
saying so already shows how things would stand, if the thought expressed is true. Thus, the 
definition of sense is given in terms of logical possibility – the significant proposition can be 
true and it can be false – it shows its truth-conditions. In other words, it is the content of the 
significant proposition, the thought expressed, that shows the truth-conditions of the proposi-
tion.  
 
  From the definition of the significant proposition follows a definition of tautologies and con-
tradictions in intensional terms: whereas the meaningful proposition says that things stand thus 
and thereby shows what is the case if it is true, a tautology says nothing about reality, but shows 
that is necessarily true – that is, true on all conditions, and a contradiction that it is necessarily 
false – which means that it is true on no conditions.  (       ) The definition of tautologies and 





  As stated by von Wright, we might thus conclude that for Wittgenstein, what the significant 
proposition says is given in extensional terms, whereas what strictly speaking cannot be said, 
only shown, is intensional. (p. 186) 
 
  We cannot say what the picture already depicts, and we cannot say what the proposition al-
ready shows – here, we are not concerned with the content of the picture, or what the proposi-
tion says is the case, but with the pictorial form that the picture already has; the logical form 
already manifest in the thought expressed by the significant proposition.  
 
 
4.121      Propositions cannot represent logical form: it is mirrored in them. 
               What finds reflection in language, language cannot represent.  
               What expresses itself in language, we cannot represent by means of language. 
               Propositions show the logical form of reality. 
               They display it. 
 
4.1212   What can be shown, cannot be said. 
 
  
   Before arriving at any final conclusions, there is still some ground to be covered. In order to 
arrive at a better understanding of the doctrine of saying and showing presented, a further dis-
cussion of the principle of bipolarity and the concept of logical possibility is required.    
 
5 EMLIANI ON SENSE     
5.1  An Internal Relation 
   In Wittgenstein’s preliminary writings in the Notes on Logic and Notebooks preceding the 
Tractatus, we find him in search of a way to understand how language and reality connect – 






   In discussing this, Emiliani has a different approach from that of von Wright. Emiliani asks 
which the conditions are for truth and falsity in propositions.  For Emiliani, the very notions of 
proposition and sense are central.  
 
  His ambition is to explain what is meant by Wittgenstein in 
 
  2.18    What any picture, of whatever form, must have in common with reality, in order to be 
able to depict it – correctly or incorrectly – in any way at all, is logical form, i.e. the form of 
reality. 
 
  In a late paper, G.E.M. Anscombe says that the problems in connection with the logical form 
of reality is one of the deepest questions in philosophy. (“The Simplicity of the Tractatus” 
p.190)  
 
  Emiliani’s task is thus of central importance. As he underlines, for Wittgenstein, a shared 
logical form in language and reality is a mark of an internal relation between them. This relation 
is the most important condition for truth or falsity in propositions. 
 
  The importance of modality in the Tractatus is seen in that Wittgenstein in turn seems to 
explain logical form in terms of possibility: 
 
  2.203     A picture contains the possibility of the situation that it represents.  
 
In his next proposition, he takes this as a condition for truth-value.  
 
2.21A picture agrees with reality or fails to agree; it is correct or incorrect, true or false. 
 
5.2 Immediacy of Agreement and of Disagreement 
  A similar question is to be found in Frege, who started out from clarifying the relation between 
the sign for a number, its name, and the number itself, the object that the name stands for. 
  For Wittgenstein, however, what is at stake is the more fundamental question of how a prop-
osition manages to communicate a situation in reality. How can a proposition about my sister 





  According to Emiliani, Wittgenstein’s theory of meaning in the Tractatus, starting out from 
the proposition endowed with sense, relies on an even more fundamental thesis concerning the 
immediacy of agreement between language and reality – between the proposition endowed 
with sense and the possible state of affairs in reality it communicates. As he points out, Witt-
genstein presents an argument for this in 4.03: 
 
   
A proposition communicates a situation to us, and so it must be essentially connected with the 
situation. 
And the connexion is precisely that it is its logical picture. 
A proposition states something only in so far as it is a picture. 
 
 
   Here, Emiliani underlines that it is not necessary that the relation of agreement holds between 
the proposition and an actual state of affairs – it is sufficient that it holds between the proposi-
tion and the possible state of affairs it describes: What the proposition says would be true, if it 
is in agreement with reality, and otherwise false. Likewise, it follows that the negation of the 
proposition would be true, if what it says disagrees with the possible state of affairs communi-
cated.  
 
   Truth and falsity are according to Emiliani external relations between proposition and fact. 
“Sinn”, on the other hand, is an internal relation between proposition and fact. In the following, 
I will present an outline of Emiliani’s argument concerning this internal relation.  
 
  Emiliani points out that Wittgenstein’s starting point in his account of ‘Sinn’ is not the “ideal 
requirements” that a formally correct proposition should meet, but the sense which ordinary 
propositions already have. (p. 4-5)  
 
  Wittgenstein starts out from “everyday language”, as Emiliani says. This is also explicitly 






  5.5563   In fact, all the propositions of our everyday language, just as they stand, are in perfect 
logical order.  –That utterly simple thing, which we have to formulate here, is not an image of 
the truth, but the truth itself in its entirety.  
   (Our problem are not abstract, but perhaps the most concrete that there are.) 
 
 
According to Emiliani, Wittgenstein’s analysis also indicates a “path to metaphysics”, for in-
stance in terms of elementary propositions. It seems that Wittgenstein took the idea from Rus-
sell’s “logical atomism”.  
 
  Some of the metaphysical doctrines in the Tractatus will be discussed later in this text, in 
connection with Hacker’s view on logical form. 
 
  For Emiliani, the “crucial move” was made by Wittgenstein before setting up a metaphysics. 
The move is that “the proposition is essentially connected” with fact. 
 
  Here, once more, modality is referred to. 
 
  Emiliani notes (p.7) that Wittgenstein’s use of “agreement” is puzzling, because agreement 
concerns “both truth and sense”. Emiliani explains the difference as follows:  
 
  “Sense is agreement and disagreement with possibilities of facts, whereas agreement with 
actual facts is truth. (p.7).  Here, modality is essential. However, Emiliani holds that Wittgen-
stein’s “modal construction” of sense cannot be presupposed in a study of the notion of agree-
ment.  
 
  This seems problematic. If so, then the “modal construction” is not that important.  
 
  Anyway, Wittgenstein’s  main insight into sense is this:  
“[The] relation of agreement between the proposition and fact is immediate; the fact with which 





  Put in general terms, agreement is only a matter of meaning or sense, i.e. semantic relations.  
For Emiliani, this means that semantic, or logical relations, cannot be explained in terms of 
“empirical” relations.  Emiliani  refers to Wittgenstein’s thesis in Philosophical Remarks (p.65) 
that Experience decides whether a proposition is true or false, but not its sense. “ 
 
  It is a surprising feature of the Tractatus that the experience of meaning, e.g. understanding a 
proposition, plays no part in his account.  
 
  Wittgenstein emphasises that language has a “speaker-independent aspect”.  
 
  Perhaps it is so that logic, which includes semantic relations, is objective, according to Witt-
genstein. Indeed, he says that “logic must take care of itself” (TLP       ). So logic needs no 
empirical backing up, it seems. 
 
  In a way, Emiliani’s discussion does not take us take us very far. He admits that “agreement” 
is connection with “Sinn” is not explained, or “defined”, as he says, in terms of anything else 
(p.23). So seems that “agreement” does not take us beyond the central notion of (logical) pos-
sibility, after all.  
 
6 HACKER ON METAPHYSICS 
6.1 Illuminating Nonsense 
  Arriving at Hacker’s explanation of the distinction between what can be said and what can 
only be shown, some problems arise. Logical necessity, manifest in tautologies and contradic-
tions, is derivable from logically well-formed propositions with sense, which can be true or 
false. A proposition can be true or false, but it must mirror reality, either as it is or as it is not.  
 
  According to Hacker, Wittgenstein’s picture theory is a metaphysical theory which must be 
separated from the necessary logical syntax presented in the form of tautologies. Hacker there-
fore holds that Wittgenstein starts out from holding that there must be a necessary correspond-
ence between the logical form of language – its logical syntax – and the logical form of the 





  The doctrine of a necessary connection cannot, however, be expressed in language, because 
a picture cannot depict itself. Yet, the logical syntax of language must mirror the logical form 
of reality. Accordingly, the logical form of reality shows in the logical syntax of language – as 
well in the propositions of logic, which are necessarily true or necessarily false, as in well-
formed contingent propositions which can be true or false. The latter are hence possibly true 
or possibly false, provided they do not violate the logical syntax of language. 29  
 
 Nonsense is the result of transgressing the limits of sense – nonsense, such as the pseudo-
propositions of mathematics or the a priori propositions of philosophy, do not “say” anything. 
Accordingly, the propositions of the Tractatus themselves are also nonsense – an attempt to 
say what can only be shown in logically well-formed propositions. 
 
  Here, Hacker protests that Wittgenstein ought to have made a clear distinction between mis-
leading nonsense – metaphysical propositions – and illuminating nonsense – the propositions 
of the Tractatus itself, which convey an inexpressible insight to the reader who sees the differ-
ence between that which can be said and that which only shows.30 
 
6.2  Truth-conditions 
   If you say that p, then that is true, if p. This is in fact Aristotle’s view. It was taken over by 
Wittgenstein (and also by Tarski). Now,  since a description is a description of a fact, it is 
natural to hold, like Wittgenstein does, that the criterion of truth lies in the fact.  
 
  In the Tractatus, the concept of truth-conditions is central. The term was introduced by Frege, 
for complex propositions. In the Tractatus, it is used also in the singular: “To understand a 
proposition is to know its truth-condition….”  This is the basis of “truth-conditional seman-
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  Hacker goes wrong when he denies that Wittgenstein offers a “truth-conditional theory of 
meaning”31 For Hacker, molecular propositions have truth-conditions, but “an elementary 
proposition has no truth-conditions”. Of course it has not, but it does have a truth-condition, in 
the singular: ‘p’ is true, iff p. This formula applies to any proposition (whichever the complex-
ity of ‘p’). 
 
  Suppose that ‘p’ is a simple (non-molecular) proposition. It is made true by p, only because 
it says that p. 
 
    This is why Wittgenstein calls a (meaningful) proposition a picture. The proposition ‘p’ is a 
picture of the fact that p, if true. The central role of modality in the Tractatus emerges in Witt-
genstein’s account of what ‘p’ is a picture of, when ‘p’ is false. It is, in the end, a picture of a 
possible state of affairs. The remark is commented on later by Wittgenstein, in Philosophical 
Investigations: 
 
    A proposition can do no more than a picture. It cannot set up (hinstellen) what is not the 
case. (§ 520)  
 
Hacker goes wrong in saying that “it is incorrect that one can isolate a logical core of the picture 
theory of meaning that is independent of logical atomism.”32 However, since ordinary propo-
sitions can be seen as pictures (as emphasised by Stenius, Hintikka, the ‘logical core’ is cer-
tainly independent of “logical atomism”). 33 
 
   The logical core of the proposition when seen as a picture is no other than the logical core of 




31 Hacker 1986, p. 61. In the first edition (1972), he accepts it. 
32 Hacker 1986, p.61 




  As the “isomorphism” between language and reality emphasized first by Stenius34, Hacker 
goes wrong in holding that ‘isomorphism’ explains how “the possibility of propositions being 
false but meaningful is explained”.  
 
  However, you cannot ‘explain’ the meaningfulness of a false proposition like: “Vienna is the 
capital of France” by noting an ‘isomorphism’, because that fact is simply not there. So you 
have to say, if you insist on “isomorphism”, that ‘p’, when false, is a picture of a possible fact. 
Yet, that possible fact is given by the meaningful proposition only, so no isomorphic corre-
spondence can be established.  
 
6.3 The metaphysics of logical form 
  For Hacker, the logical form of reality determines the logical form of language. It is reflected 
in our propositions.This view is controversial. It is the target of the “New Wittgensteinians’” 
attack on Hacker. 35 
   
   As we shall see, the state of affairs need not be an actual state of affairs; what’s important is 
the relation between the proposition and the state of affairs that would make it true.  
 
  Pace Emiliani, for Hacker, the correlation between names and objects – the logical syntax of 
language and the logical combination of objects in reality – is separated from the logical form 
of the proposition, its truth-conditions. Thus, as Emiliani rightly observes, Hacker cannot offer 
any argument for his claim that there is a metaphysical relation of formal correspondence be-
tween the proposition and the state of affairs described. On the contrary, from Hacker’s position 
one might conclude that the necessary coincidence between the possibilities of combination of 
names in language and of objects in reality does not hold. Here, Emiliani’s criticism relies on 
the observation that in case the correlation between names and objects is independent of the 
formal context in which the names occur, that is, of the meaningful proposition, then the 
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speaker could mean the names in such a way that the corresponding state of affairs would be 
impossible. 
 
For instance, the combination of names in language “Russell sleeps Frege” could, on Hacker’s 
interpretation, form a proposition violating the logical syntax of language, and thus stand for a 
metaphysically impossible combination of objects in reality.  
 
Yet, as argued by Emiliani, such a proposition has no sense. According to the Tractatus, 
(5.4733), if the proposition has no sense, it can only be because we have failed to give a mean-
ing to some of its constituents.  
 
Secondly, Emiliani points out that Hacker’s argumentation for interpreting Wittgenstein as de-
pending on ostension for the relation of language mirroring reality is quite weak. Holding that 
the proposition is linked to reality by means of ostensive definition is neglecting the many 
instances in the Tractatus where Wittgenstein draws our attention to the relation of immediacy 
of agreement. Emiliani concedes that ostensive definitions might be appealed to as a way for 
solving the problem of connection later on, in the Blue Book and the Brown Book, but that is 
not relevant at present. 
 
Thirdly, Emiliani does not think Hacker’s line of argumentation holds, because a proposition 
is not related to reality in the same way as a name is. (TLP 3.144). Propositional constituents 
(names) are not assigned meaning through independent acts of ostensive definition; Wittgen-
stein’s use of elucidations rather show that the references of names are only determined within 
their use in the context of a proposition.  
 





[T]eaching can be carried out only by means of complete propositions or complete thoughts. 
The learner has to grasp these as a whole, and, when he has done that, he will have an under-
standing of the primitive signs contained in the proposition. 36 As Emiliani concludes, in agree-
ment with McGuinness: “The reference is not attached to a name independently of its occur-
rence in a proposition – it is neither prior to sense nor independent of it.”   
 
Emiliani holds that a proposition consists of a combination of names which stand for objects, 
but the name-object relation is not prior to the sense expressed. The connection between lan-
guage and reality is a relation of agreement-disagreement, which involves the proposition as a 
whole. In other words, meaning is not established as it were bit by bit; the connection between 
name and object is given in the context of the proposition. 
 
We do not have names, denoting objects, which would somehow in addition would be  en-
dowed with possibilities of combination (a name is not a name plus a form): that a name has 
such and such a form is integral to its being such and such a name. Stenius points out that a 
propositional constituent only designates in its logico-syntactical form (cf Stenius p. 192 and 
Tlp 5.4733).  
 
Language thus mirrors the logical form of reality. A name cannot designate an object, unless 
they share the same combinatorial possibilities – forms. An object is given in its possibilities 
of combination – it is unthinkable apart from its form (2.011, 2.021, cf p. 140 ff). “Is red” only 
occurs in a meaningful proposition as a predicate with an argument-place, and this shows that 
only so, as a property that applies to an argument, can redness occur in a state of affairs.  
  
  According to Emiliani, the theory of meaning in the Tractatus, which starts out from the 
meaningful proposition, relies on an underlying, internal relation of agreement between lan-
guage and reality – between the meaningful proposition and the state of affairs in reality it 
describes. As argued by Emiliani, this underlying relation consists in the immediacy of agree-
ment between the proposition and the state of affairs described: saying that the triangle is red 
already shows the state of affairs that it would agree with, namely that the triangle is red.  
 
 





7 DIAMOND ON NONSENSE 
7.1 General Approach 
  Diamond has recently republished five critical essays on Anscombe’s views on the Tractatus. 
The essays in the book, Reading Wittgenstein with Anscombe 37 are preceded by lengthy intro-
ductions. These are of special interest, as the author in them comments on her own criticisms 
of Anscombe, and explains what her own “resolute reading” of the Tractatus (also developed 
by James Conant) is up to. Diamond wishes to stress that this reading does not mean that any 
proposition which fails to be a description of a possible state of affairs, i.e., which fails to be 
“bipolar”, or fails to be a “logical” proposition, is nonsense.  
 
  That is not the doctrine of the Tractatus, nor is that her view of that doctrine. However, it 
might be the view put forward by Anscombe. This is discussed at length.  
 
  There are very few direct quotes from Anscombe’s book Introduction to the Tractatus. In-
stead, Diamond discusses two sentences used by Anscombe, as examples of propositions which 
are “just true”, although they are not tautologies: “Red is a color” and “’Someone’ is not the 
name of someone”.  Anscombe takes these propositions to be objections to Wittgenstein’s as-
sumed view that if a proposition which is not a tautology is true, it must be bipolar. Diamond 
gives credit to Anscombe for this insight, and discusses these two kinds of true propositions on 
several occasions in her book. However, her citations are in general not primarily meant to 
back up a “resolute reading”.  She writes:  
 
This is not a volume about “the  resolute reading” of the Tractatus, although the issues that are 
connected with that reading do come up, especially in the discussions of “Red is a color”…My 
disagreement with Anscombe about statements of that sort reflects a resolute reading of Witt-
genstein on nonsense. One relatively minor change in my views about such issues is that I think 








  In fact, Diamond proceeds like any other, not resolute reader of the Tractatus. Wittgenstein’s 
remarks are taken as theses. Whether they are “nonsensical” in the end, is not discussed. This 
might surprise some of her readers. However, Diamond sees no problem, here.  
 
[Wittgenstein] says at the end that the remarks in the book are meant to be thrown away, but 
they are meant to lead you to see how to engage in an activity. If the activity that you have 
been led to is helpful, it needs no further justification; it’s just as good after you throw away 
the remarks that led you to engage in it as it was before you threw them away. I believe that 
the chunk of the Tractatus that follows TLP 3.3 is meant to be particularly helpful in enabling 
the reader to see how to engage in the activity of philosophy as Wittgenstein conceived it. The 
remarks can indeed be thrown away, but the reader can go on with the activity. (p. 27) 
                                 
Diamond’s doctrine, it seems, is that Wittgenstein’s remarks (Sätze), only have a heuristic 
value, and may be disposed after use. Yet, the “activity” of the reading is to remain. For Dia-
mond, philosophy is an activity of clarification, and as such, apparently not conclusive. There-
fore, no theses or doctrines in logic or metaphysics are needed. So, we might consider the 
Tractatus some kind of manual, only? (Cf p. 119) 
 
  This would certainly be a non-standard reading of the book. After all, Wittgenstein says, in 
the Preface, that “the truth of the thoughts communicated here seem to me unassailable and 
definitive”. It is unlikely that he meant that the only truth in the book is that his propositions 
are nonsensical.  
 
  Indeed, this is not Diamond’s doctrine, either, though her way of expressing it is somewhat 
obscure:  
 
The justification of what we do in philosophical clarification lies in its helpfulness, not in an-
ything in the Tractatus. (p. 28) 
 
So the “criticism” stands, though that is not the “important thing in the arguments presented. 
And also, Diamond refers to many remarks in the Tractatus, especially those which discuss the 






In her book, Anscombe gives a famous list of propositions which evidently are meaningful 
(p.79): 
 
- Laws of inference 
- Logical classifications, e.g. “to the right of” is a relation 
- Modal statements 
- Propositions stating probabilities 
- Propositions of mathematics 
- Laws of nature 
- Propositions about space and time 
- Propositions about the world as a whole, about God and about the meaning of life. 
 
For Anscombe, the problem is that Wittgenstein does not account for how these propositions 
have meaning,  or eventually, truth-conditions. For her, that Wittgenstein’s “sinnvolle Säzte”  
and “logical propositions” are the only ones that merit attraction is too narrow, in that is “ex-
cludes” perfectly meaningful propositions from the realm of sense. For Anscombe, Wittgen-
stein’s view of sense is to restrained, since it suggests that some, in fact meaningful, proposi-
tions are nonsense. 
 
  However, Diamond holds that there is no need to “fit in” (per impossibile) these propositions, 
which make some sense – the propositions of the Tractatus itself, among the meaningful ones.  
  For Diamond, Wittgenstein’s theory excludes nothing. It is no more than an account of obvi-
ously bipolar propositions and obviously logical propositions. The rest of the propositions in 
the list – except for the propositions of the Tractatus itself – are meaningful in their own way. 
Even if Wittgenstein calls many of them “pseudo-propositions”, that is not to be taken as a 
dismissal.  In this, Diamond is surely right. Wittgenstein certainly did not dismiss mathematics, 
or natural science. Diamond says: 
 
[M]y disagreement with Anscombe involves the contrast between reading the Tractatus as a 
guide to philosophical activity and reading it as the setting out of a complex and powerful 





Elsewhere, Diamond calls this “powerful theory” a metaphysical theory adopted by readers 
like Pears, Hacker and Malcolm. For them, the propositions of the Tractatus try to say some-
thing which cannot be said, but “shows”. Yet, these sentences are in some sense “intelligible”, 
as von Wright puts it.38 
 
  In this, von Wright is of course right. This must also be Diamond’s view (p. 95), since she 
quotes many of these problematic propositions with relish, especially the context principle. 
 
7.3 “Showing” 
  In Anscombe’s view, in the Tractatus, the notion of “showing” is important:  
 
But an important part is played in the Tractatus by the things which, though they cannot be 
‘said’, are yet ‘shewn’ or ‘ displayed’. That is to say: it would be right to call them ‘true’, since 
they cannot be said,; in fact they cannot be called true, since they cannot be said, but ‘can be 
shewn’ or ‘are exhibited’, in the propositions saying the various things that can be said. (p. 
162) 
 
Diamond has been criticized for not seeing its importance. Her defense is the following: 
 
People who give a “resolute” reading of the Tractatus are sometimes said to wind up com-
pletely junking what Wittgenstein says about saying and showing. I’ve argued (with James 
Conant) that what needs to be junked is one way of understanding Wittgenstein’s  remarks 
about showing. The point of the argument is that you can junk that understanding, (that is, junk 
the idea of what can be said  as a kind of quasipropositional content) without dropping the idea 
that what Wittgenstein says about showing is helpful – and there are various ways in which 
this might be done.  (p. 35f) 
 
So Wittgenstein’s view that “language shows the logical form of reality” (TLP 2.18) is still 
“helpful”, though we do not need the notion – it is “showing” for realizing this.  
 
 





 Diamond objects to “showing” in that it, as Anscombe says, that it shows a “ content” which, 
as Diamond puts it, is “quasi-propositional”, i.e. “it is close enough to propositionality for us 
to judge what sort of proposition it would be, if it were a proposition at all.”  (p. 165) 
 
7.4 “Behelfe der Darstellung” 
  In the article “39What Can Only Be True”?, which is not closely related to Anscombe’s view, 
Diamond sets out to rescue all Scheinsätze of the Tractatus in Anscombes list, except for the 
propositions of the Tractatus itself, by claiming that they are “Behelfe der Darstellung”. Dia-
mond writes:  
 
An expression constructed by putting an equal sign between two signs means that either of he 
flanking signs can be substituted for the other; and Wittgenstein speaks of such expressions as 
Behelfe der Darstellung: aids to representation (TLP 4.242). (p. 175f) 
 
Yet, she forgets that the propositions of the Tractatus itself are certainly not “Behelfe der Dar-
stellung”. Still, they have a function in helping us to get on with the “clarification” when we 
are in trouble. How “the world is my world”, say, could do that is not explained. So the resolute 
reading is just a programme, which in no way explains how the Tractatus propositions could 
be nonsensical, though intelligible and true. However, Diamond does not mention this passage 
in the Preface to the Tractatus. 
 
Now, the metaphysical propositions of the Tractatus are meant to give the essence of the world 
– no small thing. But then they are necessary truths. However, this is not a topic in the Tracta-
tus, Diamond writes: 
 
[It] is useful to think of the Tractatus not so much as having a stance of “modality”, as disrupt-
ing the idea of modality as a topic. The Tractatus is concerned (on the one hand) with tautolo-
gies, contradictions, and such asymmetric propositions as equations and (on the other hand) 
 
 




with various kinds of confusion that are involved in making some or other proposition to ex-
press, or to be trying to express, or intended to express, something that is necessarily the case. 
(p. 201) 
 
This means that Diamond is not prepared to discuss one obvious weakness int the Tractatus, 
namely that logical necessity is the only kind of necessity accepted. 
 
Later Wittgenstein admitted that “grammatical propositions” have a kind of necessity (“sensa-
tions are private”).  
 
7.5 Grammatical Propositions 
  That many of the propositions of the Tractatus could be “grammatical”  is not maintained by 
Diamond. The topic has been exploited by Moyal-Sherrock in a paper from 2007, “The Good 
Sense of Nonsense”: a reading of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus as non-selfrepudiation. (Philosophy 
82, 2007). (Diamond does not refer to that paper.) 
 
Instead, the two sentences from Anscombe are discussed, by Diamond: “Red is a colour”, 
“’Someone’is not the name of someone” qualify quite easily as “grammatical” as hold in PI. 
For Moylat-Sherrock, Wittgenstein is saying, in 6.54, that his Sätze are ‘unsinnige’ does not 
mean this in a “pejorative” sense. His use of nonsense is just “discriminatory” (p. 147). Moylat-
Sherrock means that the Sätze are nonsense only because they lack sense. In her own words:  
 
[N]onsense can also be what demarcates sense and is therefore not itself endowed with sense. 
This last way for something to be nonsense has been neglected by Wittgensteinians generally, 
even if (as we shall see) Wittgenstein time and again insists on it. In the light of Wittgenstein’s 
later explicit references to grammar as nonsense, I take Tractarian sentences to be expressions 
to be precursors of rules of rules of grammar. Not part of the language-game, not endowed with 
sense, but demarcating it, Tractarian sentences form a ladder from which to make sense – a 
ladder which is neither metaphysical, nor ill-formed, but grammatically elucidatory. I then dis-
solve the paradoxical ineffability  claim by making a technical distinction, based on Wittgen-
stein’s own theory and practice, between saying and speaking. Inasmuch as sayability is inter-
nally linked to sense in the Tractatus, it is the grammatical, and therefore non-sensical, nature 




cannot technically be said does not mean they cannot be spoken. Once we make this technical 
distinction between saying and speaking, the author of the Tractatus, can no longer  be taxed 
with inconsistency in articulating the unsayable. p.148 
 
So a Satz like “The world is everything that is the case” (TLP 1) does not say anything, but it 
can be “spoken”, in the way grammatical rules can be “spoken”.’’ 
 
But if  this is all that “unsinnig” means, then Wittgenstein could have called this Satz sinnlos 
(senseless), only. Wittgenstein in fact accepted that translation by Ogden. If so, then the Sätze 
have the same status as tautologies, which are true and senseless.   
 
Moylat-Sherrock backs up her interpretation by quoting the Philosophical Grammar:  
 
What belongs to grammar are all the conditions…necessary for comparing the proposition with 
reality. That is, all the conditions necessary for…understanding.” (PG p. 88) 
 
So, for Moylat-Sherrock, the Sätze expose such “conditions”. They have the form of rules, i.e. 
grammatical rules.  
 
Be that as it may, it is difficult to see the Tractatus as a book on “grammar”. It looks more like 
a treatise on logic. 
 
7.6 Lugg on Tautologies 
  In a fairly recent paper by Andrew Lugg, “Wittgenstein’s True Thoughts”40, he comes up with 
a reading very much like Moylat-Sherrock’s. Logg prefers to call the Sätze of the book tautol-
ogies, in a general sense, that is, he considers them trivially true. Lugg relies on Dreben’s and 
Floyd’s work.41  
 
 
40 NWR 2, 2013, p. 33-56  






Logg’s contribution is mainly that the Sätze –  in so far as they have a metaphysical impact – 
are not asserted in the way propositions proper are. They “show without saying” Lugg writes:  
 
In his view propositions in the Tractatus sense are assertible as well as expressible, tautologies 
merely expressible. (p. 50) 
 
What Wittgenstein means is that “his thoughts [are] to be read as sinnlos when unasserted (and 
as unsinnig only when asserted). (p. 51) 
 
Lugg is right in that tautologies cannot be asserted, according to the Tractatus. Yet, they are 
true. So by considering, say, the proposition “Logic is transcendental” as a tautology, Lugg 
can, ingeniously, consider it as true, when unasserted, and as nonsense, if asserted. Thus, he 
resolves the paradox in 6.54. 
 
  However, it is difficult to consider any statement as unasserted. “Logic is transcendental” 
looks very much like an assertion. So it is difficult to believe in Lugg’s solution.  
 
7.7 Necessary Truth 
  It is obvious that Wittgenstein gets himself in trouble by calling his Sätze both true and non-
sensical. The doctrine may well be a simple consequence of his too narrow conception of nec-
essary truth. For him, the only necessity is logical necessity (TLP 6.37). Necessity which can 
be expressed by the truth-table method. This view cannot be used for his Sätze. “The world is 
everything that is the case” is , if true, necessarily true. Yet, the truth-table method is of no 
avail in explaining that.  
 
  So Wittgenstein uses a notion of necessity for which there is no explanation in his book. That 
does not mean that the Sätze are nonsense. It only means that the book is incomplete. In this, 
he unfortunately follows Hume and Leibniz, who also were unable to justify their dichotomy 





  Kant had an explanation, the synthetic a priori. For some reason, this was not an option, for 
Wittgenstein.42 
 
To conclude: According to Alberto Emiliani, the theory of meaning presented in the Tractatus, 
starting out from the meaningful proposition, relies on an underlying, more fundamental inter-
nal relation of agreement and disagreement between language and reality – between the prop-
osition endowed with sense, and the state of affairs it describes, correctly or incorrectly. As 
argued by Emiliani, the underlying fundamental relation consists in the immediacy of agree-
ment between the proposition and the state of affairs depicted: saying that the triangle is red, 
already shows the state of affairs that would agree with it, namely that the triangle is red. 
 
However, it still seems that the notion of “possibility” is the fundamental notion in the Tracta-





42 See also A. Coffa,The semantic tradition from Kant to Carnap 
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